Volume IX, No. 2 Spring 2008
Aristotle’s Form of the Species as Relation
Theodore Di Maria, Jr.
What Was Hume’s Problem about Personal Identity in the Appendix?
Megan Blomfield
The Effect of Luck on Morality
Kerian Wallace
Love as Knowledge: the Metaphysics behind the Emotion
Matt Schuler
A Publication of the
Philosophy Department
Saint Anselm College
PDFThe question of the nature and status of Aristotelian forms has divided scholars into three general camps: those who argue that forms are particular, those who argue they are universal, and those who maintain that forms can be regarded both as particular and as universal. Each of these approaches can cite various passages in Aristotle for textual support and has the advantage of evading difficulties arising from the other approaches. However, due to fundamental problems arising from the former two approaches, which will be outlined below, the following paper will adopt the third strategy and distinguish between form in the sense of a principle of organization for a particular, concrete object (particular form) and form in the sense of species (species form), which is a universal. The concept of the species form is the central feature in this interpretation, and it will be argued that the species form is best understood as a type of relation holding between particular forms. The species form, so construed, is ontologically dependent upon the particular form, i.e. requires the particular form for its existence, but has objective, ontological status as a real feature of the world. The species form’s objective status as a relationenables it to be a basis for Aristotle’s realism about universals that neither reduces them to concepts in the mind (conceptualism) nor identifies them with entities such as Platonic Forms. However, it must be emphasized at the outset that the aim of the paper is not to argue that Aristotle expressly defends the notion of the species form as a relation. Rather, it is to argue that this interpretation of the species form is consistent with many of Aristotle’s major texts and doctrines, helps render crucial texts and doctrines intelligible, and can be viewed as implied by at least some text .
The paper will be divided into five main sections. The first section will outline standard versions of the three approaches to Aristotelian forms described above. The second section will consist of two parts: the first part describes the notion of a particular form, and the second part describes the crucial concept of the species form. The third section will examine the role of the species form in Aristotle’s discussion of definition and substance in the Metaphysics. The fourth section will consider two interpretive advantages to the present interpretation that were not brought to light in the previous analysis. The fifth and final section will address two possible objections to the present interpretation beyond those considered in the previous analysis.
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PDFHume’s theory of personal identity is the one thing in which he confesses to having made “considerable mistakes” in the Appendix to the Treatise (App. 1). There is little consensus, however, on what exactly was the source of his discontent. There is not time in this paper to discuss the multitude of opinions that have been given on the Appendix, but in what follows I will explain what I think was troubling Hume. I think that Hume finds that his explanation of how we attribute simplicity and identity to our minds fails once we are aware that the mind is a bundle of all our perceptions. I will then briefly discuss Pitson’s criticism of this sort of interpretation, concluding that Pitson’s objections are unsuccessful.
Hume’s theory of mind essentially states that the mind is a bundle of perceptions. It is important, therefore, to understand exactly what perceptions are according to Hume. Perceptions are all that is present to the mind, whether sensing, thinking, reflecting or “actuated with passions” (Ab. 5). They are separated into impressions and ideas, which differ in terms of degree of “force and liveliness” (T, 1.1.1.1). Impressions are those perceptions that have most “force and violence”, whereas ideas are the fainter perceptions we have whenever we reflect on other perceptions. I think that Hume seems to take an action theory of perceptions, in which they have an awareness of their objects built into them – a perception isn’t an image, rather it is an awareness of an image. Since a perception of a perception is an awareness of a perception, to become aware of a perception is for an idea of it to occur. You are not aware of your perceptions unless you reflect upon them.
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PDFIn his work Moral Luck Thomas Nagel suggests that morality is determined by luck. He argues that it affects not only society’s evaluation of an act but also ones ability to be moral. He is correct in recognizing that an agent is not always fully responsible for the consequences of their actions; however he understates the value society places on intention. A person’s moral capacity is a matter of chance, as natural characteristics are not chosen by an agent. Luck is an important consideration when evaluating the morality of both the action and the person themselves, but determining how much responsibility may be placed on destiny is difficult. If we allow for luck to account for too much than no one may be praised or criticized for their actions; however if not enough value is given to luck then it seems we unfairly evaluate persons based on factors beyond their control. Nagel is right to suggest that some factors affecting a person’s ability to be moral are a matter of fate.
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Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) became well-known for his ethics of reverence for life. While Schweitzer’s life and his ethics have had an enormous appeal to wide audiences all over the world, philosophers have generally ignored his contribution. This may be a loss for philosophy, for, despite some internal problems, Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life promises a viable alternative to consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics.
The task of this paper is the following: Schweitzer argues that reverence for life is the basic ethical principle and the highest moral value. After a brief presentation of Schweitzer’s life and moral philosophy, I will consider two questions: 1. Can Schweitzer show that reverence for life is the highest moral value (principle)? 2. Is reverence for life a moral value (principle) in the first place? I will argue that, with some provision, Schweitzer’s position is tenable.
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What does it mean to be a person? Is there a special set of criteria that must be met in order for one to be correctly called a ‘person’? Are all humans persons? Or can it be that some humans are not persons? What about nonhuman beings; can anything nonhuman be categorized as a person? All of these questions aim at discovering the nature of personhood and determining the kinds of entities that can properly be considered persons. When addressing these questions, however, the answers that one comes up with may vary according to the way one defines ‘personhood’. In this essay, I will focus on these questions by comparing the accounts of personhood given by three contemporary thinkers who hold contrasting positions on the issue: Harry Frankfurt, Joseph Raz and Gary Watson. The first section of this essay explains Frankfurt’s account of personhood. The second section focuses on a criticism of Frankfurt’s view waged by Raz and the alternative account of personhood that Raz advocates. Similarly, the third section focuses on a criticism of Frankfurt’s view posited by Watson and the alternative account of personhood that Watson advances. Throughout the course of this essay, I will highlight the flaws of Frankfurt’s account which I think make his theory rather problematic. Since the scope of this essay is mainly concentrated on Frankfurt’s thesis, I will mention the accounts of personhood that Raz and Watson offer only for comparative purposes, without delving into a critique of their theories as well.
In his essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry Frankfurt argues that the criteria of personhood demand more than just a certain type of genetic constitution. A person is a special entity whose existence is more profound than one’s biological happenstance. Being of the species Homosapien is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of personhood. Conceptually speaking, the philosophic notion of ‘personhood’ is defined in a way that neither necessarily includes all human entities nor precludes all nonhuman entities from qualifying as persons. In Frankfurt’s words,
Our concept of ourselves as persons is not to be understood… as a concept of attributes that are necessarily species-specific. It is conceptually possible that members of novel or even of familiar nonhuman species should be person; and it is also conceptually possible that some members of the human species are not persons. (Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, Jan. 1971, p. 6.)
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Callicles holds a desire-fulfilment conception of happiness; it is something like, that is, the continual satisfaction of desires that constitutes happiness for him. He claims that leading the happy life consists in having many desires, letting them grow as strong as possible and then being able to satisfy them (e.g. 491e, 494c). For Callicles, this life of maximum pursuit of desires consists in a kind of absolute freedom, where there is very little practice of restraint; happiness consists of luxury, unrestraint, and freedom (492b-c). Socrates develops his objections to Callicles’ life of freedom by appealing to two myths once told to him by a wise man. I draw out what I think are the two primary objections and consider to what extent they might be seen to damage Callicles’ position. I conclude that Callicles’ view on freedom can adequately meet one of Socrates’ objections but not the other.
As mentioned, Socrates’ initial response to Callicles’ “life of freedom” proposal comes in the form of two myths he heard once (493aff). The myths are introduced on the heels of a crucial discussion about temperance, an important traditional Greek virtue. Socrates has just asked Callicles whether he takes an individual “ruling himself” to mean being temperate and self-mastering over the pleasures and desires in oneself (491e), and Callicles has responded by mocking such a view; self-control or self-mastery is for stupid people, he says. He goes on to state that a man cannot be happy if he’s enslaved to anyone at all, including himself (491e). Socrates clearly takes this, and the myths which follow, with the utmost seriousness, as he begs Callicles not to let up in any way, so that it may really become clear how one ought to live (492d).
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My limbs moved with a positiveness and precision
With which I seemed to have
Nothing at all to do.
(Gary Snyder, from John Muir on Mt. Ritter)
The philosophical relationship between Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl is a peculiar one. In the third decade of the twentieth century, Heidegger was Husserl’s protégé, expected to carry on Husserl’s phenomenological project. In 1927, with Being and Time, though a book dedicated to Husserl, Heidegger made his diverging philosophical interests clear to his mentor. Husserl conceived of his phenomenology as the a priori science of consciousness, the ground for the empirical sciences. Tellingly, Heidegger mentions “consciousness” only twice in his magnum opus. Some have seen this as a sharp break with Husserl, although his phenomenological influence clearly looms large. Others see Heidegger as continuing Husserl’s project, however past the limits with which its originator had envisioned. The movement from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is surely a long and complicated evolution of ideas. We will specifically look at the philosophies of these two as articulated mainly in the 1920s. The current paper will attempt to orient this transition towards the revitalization and reinvestigation of the notion of intentionality. We will explore continuities and differences in terms of the methods and aims that each thinker associates with the enterprise of “philosophy.”
Heidegger claims to be doing phenomenology, though understood in his own way. Heidegger is apparently unconcerned with many of the central concepts of Husserl’s system, e.g. the epoche, consciousness, subjectivity, etc. He writes of Being, Dasein, Being-in-the-world, and other neologisms. An important difference is how they conceive of phenomenology. Husserl thought of phenomenology as the rigorous study of that which is given to us in phenomenological reflection, in order to arrive at the essential features of experience. For Heidegger, phenomenology is a method through which one can apprehend the Being of beings. The uniting concern for both is the problematic of intentionality. Intentionality is the impetus for the birth of transcendental philosophy as well as the key to understanding its evolution under Heidegger’s influence. We will see that it is due to Heidegger’s phenomenological reconception of intentionality in terms of his ontological interests which leads to a fresh understanding of human experience.
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Volume IX, No. 1 Fall 2007
LYCEUM
Reverence for Life: A Moral Value or the Moral Value?
Predrag Cicovacki
On the Concept of Personhood:
A Comparative Analysis of Three Accounts
Martin Alexander Vezér
Happiness and Freedom in Socrates and Callicles
Kristian Urstad
The Being of Intentionality
Sean McGovern